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1

INTRODUCTION

We are conscious of ourselves as selves, conscious subjects that have experiences, entertain
thoughts, carry out actions, etc. But it is a matter of contention whether we are conscious of
selves as mental selves, entities that have mental properties but do not have bodily properties, or
as embodied selves, entities that have both mental and bodily properties.
Galen Strawson (2009) argues that we are conscious of ourselves as mental selves. In
particular, he argues that there is a form of self-consciousness that involves a conception of the
mental self. Strawson’s argument hinges on the claim that there is a form of self-consciousness
that involves a conception of the self and a conception of oneself “solely in one’s mental
aspects” (111). I will call this form of self-consciousness a minimal form of self-consciousness
(MSC). Since MSC involves a conception of oneself “solely in one’s mental aspects,” MSC does
not involve a conception of oneself as having a body. Therefore, MSC exclusively involves a
conception of the mental self and does not involve a conception of the embodied self.
Strawson’s mental self view is opposed to the embodied self view. According to the
embodied self view, self-consciousness must involve a conception of the embodied self. One
must be conscious of one’s experiencing or thinking self as “a spatially extended object” (Brewer
1995) or as “shaped, located, and solid” (Cassam 1999). On this view, Strawson’s MSC, which is
also a form of self-consciousness, should then also involve a conception of the self as having
such spatial features. Strawson, by contrast, attempts to show that consciousness of ourselves as
spatially extended is not essential to consciousness of the self.
In this paper, I will argue against Strawson’s mental self view and for the embodied self
view. In particular, I will argue that Strawson is not justified in holding that MSC involves a
conception of oneself “solely in one’s mental aspects.” If Strawson is not justified in holding that

2

MSC involves a conception of oneself solely in one’s mental aspects, he will then fail to
establish his account of the mental self.
In section 2, I will explain Strawson’s view of our ordinary conception of the self. I will
then explain how, on Strawson’s account, self-consciousness involves a conception of the self,
and in particular, a conception of the mental self. After laying out Strawson’s view, I will then
present my objection. I will argue that Strawson ignores a crucial component of MSC, which is
self-ascription, the ability to ascribe mental features to oneself. This ability, as P. F. Strawson
(1959) points out, is constitutively linked to other-ascription, the ability to ascribe mental
features to others. On P. F. Strawson’s view, since self-ascription is constitutively linked to
other-ascription, self-consciousness must involve a conception of oneself as bodily, for a selfconscious being needs some relevant conception of bodily features to ascribe mental features to
others. Strawson’s1 MSC, which is a form of self-consciousness, then must involve a conception
of oneself as bodily.
In section 3, I will draw on Gareth Evans’ Generality Constraint to further elaborate on
this constitutive link between self-ascription and other-ascription, and thereby hold that MSC
involves a conception of the embodied self rather than the mental self. I will then consider
Strawson’s possible responses and argue that those responses either do not work or would end up
undermining his mental self view. I will thus conclude that Strawson fails to provide a
satisfactory account of the mental self that can counter the embodied self view.

In what follows, ‘Strawson’ refers to Galen Strawson unless noted otherwise, while I will
include “P. F.” for the elder Strawson.
1
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2

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SELF AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Strawson (2009) holds that most human beings have the experience of the self, which is the
experience of oneself as an “‘inner’ locus of consciousness” and “a mental presence, a mental
someone, a mental something that is a conscious subject” (36). He claims that such experience is
especially vivid when one is aware of “the fact that one’s thoughts are unobservable by others
and of the fundamental respect in which one is ‘alone in one’s head’” (8, 36).
On Strawson’s view, the experience of the self is a “cognitive experience,” which is an
experience that is informed by the conception of the self (38). In order to know about our
conception of the self, Strawson claims, we need to examine our experience of the self and pin
down the essential elements that structure such experience. With these essential elements, which
I will explain more about later, Strawson then turns to argue that there is a form of selfconsciousness, a minimal form of consciousness (MSC) as I will call it, that involves these
essential elements. Given that these essential elements are indicators of an experience or a
conception of the self, Strawson holds that MSC involves an experience or a conception of the
self.
After establishing the claim that MSC involves a conception of the self, Strawson then
points out that MSC is a form of self-consciousness that involves consciousness of oneself
“solely in one’s mental aspects” (111), and thus MSC involves a conception of the mental self.
However, I will argue that MSC in fact involves a conception of oneself as bodily, and thus MSC
involves a conception of the embodied self.
2.1

The Experience of the Self and the Conception of the Self

Strawson holds that the experience of the self has some structure, and he attempts to identify the
structuring elements that are essential to such experience. From the understanding of those
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elements essential to our experience of the self, he holds that we can know about our conception
of the self. Although Strawson does not specify how the experience of the self and the
conception of the self are related, he maintains that these two have a close relation. In what
follows, I will explain what those essential elements are and what they tell us about our
conception of the self.
The first two elements are subject of experience and the mental, which are stated in
Strawson’s definition of the experience of the self. The experience of the self, as Strawson
defines it, is the experience of oneself as “a mental something that is a conscious subject” (36).
For Strawson, such an experience is “the experience that people have of themselves as being an
‘inner’ locus of consciousness, something that is essentially not the same thing as a human being
considered as a whole” (36). He also claims:
The sense of oneself as an inner conscious presence, the early realization of the
fact that one’s thoughts are unobservable by others, the experience of the
profound sense in which one is alone in one’s head or mind, the experience of
oneself as experiencing, as having a ‘palpitating inward life’—these aspects of
[self]-experience are among the deepest facts about human existence. (36)
Strawson thus holds that the experience of the self essentially involves the element of subject of
experience and the mental. It follows that our conception of the self essentially involves a
conception of a subject of experience and a conception of the mental.
The third element is a thing or object. According to Strawson, our ordinary experience of
the self involves the experience of ourselves as a thing that has feelings, entertains thoughts,
carries out actions, etc. Such experience, Strawson claims, implies that we ordinarily conceive of
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the self as something that “has properties” but “is not itself just a property of something else”
(65). Such conception, Strawson claims, implies a conception of the self as a thing or object.
The fourth element is singleness or singularity. On Strawson’s view, the experience of
the self as a thing or object implies the experience of the self as something that is single. This
singleness, Strawson claims, is not the kind of singleness that a single bundle of things has.
Rather, he holds that the self is experienced as single “in the way in which a single marble is
figured as single when compared with a single group of marbles” (72). His point is that when we
experience ourselves as a thing or object, we also experience ourselves as having certain causal
features, as something that “can affect things and can be affected” (66). The causal profile of the
self, he claims, is similar to the causal profile of a single marble rather than of a group of
marbles, in the sense that a single marble has some kind of “unity of internal causal
connectedness” that is stronger than the unity of a group of marbles (72). However, Strawson
does not specify what this unity of internal causal connectedness is and in what sense the self has
the kind of unity that makes it more like a single thing rather than a group or bundle of things.
Nevertheless, Strawson holds that the self is experienced as a single thing rather than a bundle of
things, and he then claims that the self is conceived of as a single thing. With the above four
essential elements: subject of experience, the mental, a thing or object, and singleness, Strawson
concludes that our conception of the self is essentially a subject of experience-as-single-mentalthing (172).
Here, some may argue that Strawson does not fully capture our conception of the self
with these four elements, for our experience of the self usually involves something more than
just being a subject of experience that is a single mental thing. For example, we also experience
ourselves as being an agent or having diachronic existence. Strawson, by contrast, claims that
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the element of agency and the element of diachronic existence are not essential to the experience
of the self. His reason is that we experience ourselves as conscious subjects, even when we do
not experience ourselves as agents or as persisting. We may sometimes be conscious of ourselves
solely as passive beings with experiences flowing through us, or we may sometimes have no
thoughts of our long-term existence. However, Strawson claims, it seems that at those moments,
we still have a vivid experience of the self.
Others, especially proponents of the embodied self view, may argue that when we
experience ourselves as conscious subjects, we also experience ourselves as having a body.
Given the constant existence of our background bodily awareness such as proprioception, there
seems to be no reason to believe that when we experience ourselves as conscious subjects, we do
not also experience ourselves as having a body. Strawson, however, argues that “the constantly
impinging phenomena of one’s mental life are in any case more salient in the constitution of
one’s sense that there is such a thing as the self than are the phenomena of bodily experience,
and it is this sense of self that is of primary concern” (29).
Strawson’s claim is built on an examination of the experience of the self. However, it is
arguable that some people always experience themselves as having a body, and that they cannot
experience themselves as selves unless they also experience themselves as having a body. These
people may object to Strawson and argue that Strawson misdescribes the experience of the self
since the experience of having a body is no less salient than “the constantly impinging
phenomena of one’s mental life” are in constituting one’s sense of self. To further substantiate
his mental self view, Strawson needs to provide further evidence for his description of the
experience such that it involves a conception of something that can be called as the self and is a
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purely mental thing. Strawson, then, turns to the discussion of self-consciousness and from
which he attempts to provide further support for his mental self view.
2.2

Self-Consciousness and the Conception of the Mental Self

Strawson argues that there is a form of self-consciousness that involves a conception of the self
and does not involve a conception of the body. He thus argues that this form of selfconsciousness involves a conception of the mental self. His view, however, does not rule out the
possibility that there are other forms of self-consciousness that involve a conception of the
embodied self. What Strawson attempts to show here is that there is at least one form of selfconsciousness that exclusively involves a conception of the mental self (i.e., it does not involve
any conception of oneself as embodied).
According to Strawson, one entertains this form of self-consciousness when one thinks,
for example, “I’m thinking” or “I’m feeling pain.” When one thinks so, Strawson claims, one
thinks of oneself “solely in one’s mental aspects” (2009, 111), since thinking and feeling pain are
both one’s mental states.2 I will call this form of self-consciousness a minimal form of selfconsciousness (MSC). I call it a minimal form since, as I will explain it in the later section,
Strawson argues that this form of self-consciousness involves few conceptual preconditions. On
Strawson’s view, since this minimal form of self-consciousness, MSC, is consciousness of
oneself “solely in one’s mental aspects,” it follows that MSC does not involve a conception of
oneself as having a body.
Strawson then argues that MSC involves a conception of the self, by arguing that MSC
involves a conception of oneself that satisfies the four essential elements of the conception of the

Some may argue that one must have a body in order to have a feeling of pain. Strawson’s claim
here, however, is that although having a feeling of pain may depend on having a body, this
dependence is not constitutive.
2
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self. He begins his argument by claiming that when one entertains MSC and thinks “I’m
thinking,” one necessarily thinks of oneself as “the thinker or haver of the thought” with this use
of ‘I’ (114).3 He then argues that, first of all, the thinker is essentially something that bears
thoughts or experiences. Thus, when one thinks of oneself as the thinker, one must think of
oneself as a subject of experience. Second, the thinker is essentially something that has
properties, such as the properties of having experiences and entertaining thoughts. Thus, when
one thinks of oneself as the thinker, one must think of oneself as a thing. Third, since the
properties of the thinker are mental properties, one must think of oneself as something that is
mental. Finally, since one thinks of oneself as the thinker, one must think of oneself as
something that is single rather than multiple (114).
Strawson thus concludes that when one entertains MSC and thinks “I’m thinking,” one
conceives of oneself as a subject of experience-as-single-mental-thing, and thus conceives of
oneself as a self. Since MSC does not involve a conception of oneself as having a body,
Strawson claims, MSC involves a conception of the self that is the mental self.
More precisely, Strawson’s view is that MSC’s involving a conception of the self does
not depend its involving a conception of the body. In other words, the conception of oneself qua
mental is sufficient for the conception of oneself qua subject of experience-as-single-thing.
However, proponents of the embodied self view hold that this sufficient relation cannot stand.
The reason is that one’s conception of oneself as a single thing must be grounded in one’s
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Here, theorists such as Gilbert Ryle may object that one can never think of oneself as the
thinker. His reason is that this way of thinking of oneself requires a higher-order act; but such a
higher-order act cannot be acted upon by the one who performs the act (Ryle 1949, 175). To
avoid this line of objection, Strawson appeals to an unreflective form of self-consciousness and
argues that a self-conscious being can unreflectively think of oneself as the thinker. This
unreflective form of self-consciousness, he claims does not require performing some higherorder acts as Ryle describes (see Strawson 2009, 176-181).
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conception of oneself as having a single body (e.g., see Bermúdez et al. 1995; Campbell 1995;
Cassam 1997). Without a conception of the body, it is not possible for the essential elements of
the conception of the self to be satisfied. Thus, proponents of the embodied self view hold that
MSC, which involves a conception of the self, must involve a conception of oneself as having a
body.
However, even if it is true that the essential elements of the conception of the self can be
satisfied just by experiencing oneself in certain ways, MSC may still require a conception of
oneself as having a body. The reason is that MSC does not just involve a conception of the self.
Instead, MSC involves something more, and this something is self-ascription, the ability to
ascribe features to oneself. Self-ascription, as I will argue, involve a conception of oneself as
bodily.
Thus, granted that the essential elements of the conception of the self can be satisfied just
by experiencing oneself in certain ways, I will argue that MSC still involves a conception of
oneself as bodily. I will draw on P. F. Strawson’s theory of persons to illustrate this point.
2.3

Self-Ascription and the Conception of Other Subjects

Self-consciousness involves self-ascription. MSC, which is a form of self-consciousness, also
involves self-ascription. When one thinks “I’m feeling pain,” one ascribes an experience of pain
to oneself. However, as P. F. Strawson (1959) points out, one who is able to ascribe mental
features to oneself must also be able to ascribe those mental features to others. Because of otherascription, he claims, one’s conception of those mental features must involve a conception of
bodily features. It then follows that MSC involves a conception of oneself as bodily. I will
explain P. F. Strawson’s view in what follows.
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According to P. F. Strawson, there is a necessary condition for one’s ascribing mental
features to oneself such that “one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to
others who are not oneself” (99). He holds that this is a purely logical point: “the idea of a
predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate
can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed” (99, n. 1).
P. F. Strawson then points out that the way one ascribes mental features to others is based
on observing their behaviors. Thus, in order to ascribe mental features to others, one must have
some sense of what it is like for others to have those mental features in terms of their behaviors.
It follows that one’s conception of the mental features must include relevant bodily features. P.
F. Strawson thus famously holds “the primitiveness of the concept of a person.” On this view,
one’s conception of oneself in self-consciousness is a person, a type of entity to which both
mental features and bodily features are equally ascribable (102).
Strawson takes P. F. Strawson’s view as a threat to his mental self view. If P. F.
Strawson’s view is right, then it seems that MSC, which involves self-ascribing mental features,
must constitutively involve a conception of oneself as having bodily features. It then seems to
follow that Strawson is not justified in claiming that MSC involves thinking of oneself solely in
one’s mental aspects.4

Here, some may point out that, it seems, P. F. Strawson’s view only implies that the ability to
ascribe mental features requires the ability to track relevant bodily behaviors. However, it does
not follow from such view that when one thinks “I’m feeling pain,” one cannot conceptually
separate the mental and the bodily states and think of one’s feeling of pain as a purely mental
state. It then seems Strawson can in fact argue that even if P. F. Strawson’s view is correct, MSC
can still involve thinking of oneself solely in one’s mental aspects. Thus, Strawson’s mental self
view still holds. However, I think this position demands a clear definition of what it is to have a
conception of the mental and how having a conception of the mental is different from having a
conception of the body, and, as I will argue in Section 3.3, such a definition is exactly where
Strawson’s view falls short.
4
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Strawson thus attempts to reject P. F. Strawson’s view. He does so by pointing out that
the key move in P. F. Strawson’s view is that “the notions of self and other are essentially
correlative” (124). He then takes P. F. Strawson’s view to be committed to a thesis that he calls
the Conception of Others Thesis, and he aims to argue that this thesis is wrong. By doing so, he
claims that P. F. Strawson cannot establish the embodied self view by arguing for an essential
relation between the notion of the self and the other (124).
Here is the Conception of Others Thesis:
The Conception of Others Thesis (COT): If one is self-conscious, one must possess some
conception of other subjects of experience (Strawson 2009, 121).
COT applies to all forms of self-consciousness. However, the focus here is on MSC, which is
only one of those forms. I will thus limit the discussion of COT solely on MSC, the form of selfconsciousness that is characterized as consciousness of oneself solely in one’s mental aspects:
COT’: If one entertains MSC, one must possess some conception of other subjects of experience.
P. F. Strawson’s view, understood in terms of COT’, is that since MSC necessarily involves selfascription, and since self-ascription is necessarily linked to other-ascription, it follows that MSC
necessarily involves a conception of other subjects of experience. And it is because MSC
necessarily involves a conception of other subjects of experience that MSC involves a
conception of oneself as bodily.
Strawson, thus, argues that COT’ is wrong. However, he does not provide a direct
response to P. F. Strawson’s claim that self-ascription is necessarily linked to other-ascription.
Instead, he opts to argue that one who entertains MSC can conceive of oneself as a subject of
experience without having a conception of other subjects (121-123). His reasoning is
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summarized as follows: MSC involves a conception of the self, and thus involves a conception of
oneself as a subject of experience. If having a conception of oneself as a subject of experience
does not depend on having a conception of other subjects of experience, then MSC does not
require a conception of other subjects of experience. It then follows that COT’ is wrong.
Strawson’s strategy, again, is to argue that one who entertains MSC can conceive of
oneself as a subject of experience just by experiencing oneself in certain way, which is
experiencing oneself as a subject of experience. He holds that such way of experiencing oneself
does not require further justification, and thus does not depend on having a conception of other
subjects of experience. It follows that MSC does not require a conception of other subjects.
However, I think that Strawson’s argument shifts the topic from the link between selfascription and other-ascription to the relation between conceiving of oneself as subject and
conceiving of other subjects. Moreover, his argument assumes that there is no other component
of self-consciousness that may require a conception of other subjects of experience. However, in
addition to conceiving of oneself as a subject, there is a component of self-consciousness that
may involve a conception of other subjects. This component is self-ascription. And it seems that
there is a fundamental sense of the conception of oneself as a subject of experience, such that it
is because one self-ascribe mental features that one conceives of oneself as a subject of
experience. In the next section, I will draw on Evans’ Generality Constraint to elaborate on the
link between self-ascription and other-ascription, and thereby argue for COT’.
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3

A CONSTITUTIVE LINK BETWEEN SELF-ASCRIPTION AND OTHERASCRIPTION

Self-conscious thoughts are conceptual thoughts. On Strawson’s view, self-conscious thoughts
must involve deploying the quasi-linguistic concept of “I.” Animals that are unable to deploy this
quasi-linguistic concept, Strawson claims, do not count as having genuine self-consciousness
(105).
According to Evans (1982), conceptual thoughts obey a rule that he calls the Generality
Constraint. According to the Generality Constraint, if one can deploy the concept of being F and
think that an object a is F, one must have the conceptual resources to think that b is F, c is F, etc.,
where b and c are objects other than a (101-102). On this view, one who can ascribe a predicate
to oneself must also be able to ascribe such a predicate to other distinct subjects. Predicates, thus,
are inherently general. I take this view to imply that one who is able to ascribe a predicate to
oneself must also be able to ascribe such a predicate to subjects other than oneself. Thus, selfascription is constitutively linked to other-ascription.
Evans develops his Generality Constraint from P. F. Strawson’s view. Unlike P. F.
Strawson, who does not say much about the link between self-ascription and other-ascription,
Evans provides more explanations for it. According to Evans, “any thought which we can
interpret as having the content that a is F involves the exercise of an ability—knowledge of what
it is for something to be F—which can be exercised in indefinitely many distinct thoughts, and
would be exercised in, for instance, the thought that b is F” (103, emphasis added).
I take Evans’ point to imply that the ability to self-ascribe mental features and the ability
to ascribe mental features to others involve the same ability, the ability to know what it is for
someone to have those mental features. This point provides further support for the constitutive
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link between self-ascription and other-ascription. MSC, which involves self-ascription must also
involve other-ascription, for self- and other-ascription are grounded in the same ability. MSC
then must involve a conception of other subjects of experience. It follows that COT’ is true. In
what follows, I will consider Strawson’s possible objections and provide my responses.
3.1

Other-Ascription

I’ve drawn on Evans’ Generality Constraint to elaborate on the constitutive link between selfascription and other-ascription. However, Strawson may argue that the inference from the
Generality Constraint to the constitutive link between self- and other-ascription is too hasty. He
may argue that even if it is true that one who is able to ascribe a predicate to oneself must also be
able to ascribe such a predicate to other distinct subjects, it seems that one can ascribe the
predicate to distinct subjects at different points in time who are all oneself. It then follows that
Strawson can grant Evans’ Generality Constraint but in the meantime hold that there is not a
constitutive link between self-ascription and other-ascription.5 He can thus maintain that MSC
does not involve a conception of subjects other than oneself, and thus COT’ is false.6
However, I don’t think that Strawson can defend his position (i.e., there is no constitutive
link between self- and other-ascription) by arguing that the Generality Constraint can be satisfied
by ascribing predicates to distinct subjects at different points in time who are all oneself. It is
unclear whether a subject’s being at different points in time can be counted as genuinely distinct
subjects. It may be true that, for instance, me-at-high-school and me-at-college are different in
certain important aspects. Nevertheless, it seems that both of them are me.

Here, some may point out that it is unclear whether, on Strawson’s view, my past or future
selves do not count as “others” for my current self. I think that although Strawson does hold that
my past or future selves are not identical to my current self, all of them are me in the sense that
they are located in the same persisting body.
6
Cf. Bermúdez 2000.
5
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Strawson may explain this point with his Transience View of the self (Strawson 2009).
According to the Transience View, mental selves or subjects are “short-lived or transient,” and
each exists within “a temporal period of a synergy of neural activity” (273). On this view, not
only is it the case that me-at-high-school and me-at-college are ontologically different subjects,
but me-an-hour-ago and me-now are also ontologically different subjects. The feeling of having
a persisting mental self is merely an illusion. It seems to follow from this Transience View that a
subject’s being at different points in time are genuinely distinct subjects.
However, I don’t think that Strawson can draw on his Transience View of the self to
argue that Generality Constraint does not entail a constitutive link between self- and otherascription, and uses this argument to reject COT’. On my view, Strawson’s Transience View
presupposes the mental self view. Using the Transience View to argue against COT’ and thereby
defend the mental self view will then be begging the question.
Strawson’s Transience View presupposes his mental self view since he holds that
although selves are transient, we have a sense of the persisting self. Although he argues that this
sense of the persisting self is simply an illusion, he nevertheless needs something persistent for
grounding such an illusion. This something is an embodied self or what he calls “the human
being as a whole,” which is a subject of experience that has both mental and bodily aspects.
Since the illusion of the persisting self is grounded in the embodied self, the transient selves then
cannot be the embodied selves. It then follows that the transient selves must be the mental selves.
In other words, Strawson needs to take transient selves as mental selves in order for holding that
they are transient.
Strawson, thus, cannot use the Transience View to argue that one’s selves at different
points in time count as distinct subjects and that the Generality Constraint does not entail a
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constitutive link between self- and other-ascription. Here, Strawson may go ahead and accept
that the Generality Constraint entails that there is a constitutive link between self- and otherascription. However, there is such a link only in the sense that when one is able to self-ascribe
mental features, one then has some conceptual resources to develop the ability to ascribe mental
features to others. However, such an ability may have not yet been developed. One then does not
have an actual ability to ascribe mental features to others. Strawson can thus hold that selfascription has priority over other-ascription. Then, it follows that even if it is true that the
Generality Constraint entails a constitutive link between self- and other-ascription, COT’ may
still be false. Given that there is a possibility for a self-ascriber to have no actual ability to
ascribe mental features to others, it seems that a self-ascriber may have no conception of other
subjects. Thus, MSC, the form of self-consciousness that involves consciousness of oneself
solely as one’s mental aspects, may involve no conception of other subjects of experience. I will
consider Strawson’s such possible objection in section 3.2.
3.2

Self-Ascription, Priority, and Thought-Elements

Strawson indeed holds that self-ascription has priority over other-ascription. As he claims, it is
arguable that the most one can say about self-consciousness is, if one is self-conscious, “one
must have the ability—the mental resources—to come to possess and deploy some conception of
other subjects of experience” (122). However, having the ability to come to possess and deploy
some conception of other subjects of experience does not entail that one actually has a
conception of other subjects of experience. One may have the potential to develop such a
conception, but for some reasons the conception has not yet been developed.
However, if Strawson argues that self-ascription has priority over other-ascription by
holding that a self-conscious being may not have the actual ability to conceive of other subjects,
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I argue, Strawson will then end up undermining his mental self view. But before I can put
forward my argument, I have to explain Strawson’s view on the constituents of self-conscious
thoughts.
Strawson has a cognitive-experiential or cognitive-phenomenological view on selfconscious thoughts (Strawson 2009, also see Strawson 2011). He argues that self-conscious
thoughts, just like our sensory experiences, have experiential or phenomenological characters.
That is to say, he holds that not only is it the case that there is what it is like for us to have certain
sensory experiences, but also there is what it is like for us to have self-conscious thoughts. Selfconscious thoughts, on this view, are constituted by what he calls “thought-elements” or
“experience-structuring mental elements” (44). Strawson holds that our experiences have certain
structure, and thought-elements are just the structural elements of our experiences. He also
maintains that those elements which allow us not only to experience things but also
conceptualize things in certain ways (Strawson 2009, 44, n. 40).
According to Strawson, a self-conscious being must have the following thoughtelements: (a) the thought-element of subject of experience, (b) the thought-element of oneself,
and (c) some conception of experience (118-120).7 The reason is that, first of all, selfconsciousness involves a conception of the self, a subject of experience-as-single-mental-thing.
A self-conscious being thus must have the thought-element of subject of experience. Second, if a
being has a thought-element of subject of experience, the being must also have some grasp of
experience, and thus have some conception of experience. Third, self-consciousness is

7

The thought-element of oneself is different from the thought-element of subject of experience
since it is possible for one to deploy the thought-element of subject of experience without
deploying the thought-element of oneself. For example, one may think of a person as a subject of
experience without thinking of that person as oneself.
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essentially related to the entertainment of first-person thoughts, such as the thought “I’m
thinking” (Castañeda 1966, Perry 1979). Thus, a self-conscious being must have the thoughtelement of “I” or oneself.
Furthermore, Strawson claims that if one has the thought-element of oneself, one must
also have (d) the thought-element of not-oneself (119). It seems that one cannot be said to
conceive of something as oneself unless one can also conceive of some other thing as notoneself, just like one cannot really be said to know what is “up” unless one also knows what is
“down.”
Equipped with (a) the thought-element of subject of experience and (d) the thoughtelement of not-oneself, Strawson claims, a self-conscious being then has the conceptual
resources to form the thought-element of something that is both a subject of experience and is
not-oneself, that is, the thought-element of other subjects of experience. However, he argues that
it does not follow from the fact that one has the conceptual resources to form the thoughtelement of other subjects of experience that one actually possesses and deploys the thoughtelement of other subjects of experience (122). It follows from Strawson’s claim that a selfconscious being who is capable of self-ascription may nevertheless lack an actual conception of
other subjects of experience. Thus, self-ascription has priority over other-ascription.
However, I question Strawson’s reasoning regarding having (a) the thought-element of
subject of experience and (d) the thought-element of not-oneself does not entail having a
thought-element of not-oneself. I argue that when one has the thought-element of subject of
experience and the thought-element of not-oneself, one then has the thought-element of other
subjects of experience. When one has the ability to conceive of subject of experience and notoneself, one then has the ability to conceive of something both as a subject of experience and as
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not-oneself. It follows that one has an actual ability to conceive of something as another subject
of experience, and thus have a thought-element of other subjects of experience. There is no
reason to believe that having thought-elements (a) and (d) does not entail having their
combination.
Moreover, it seems to follow from the Generality Constraint that having the thoughtelements (a) and (d) entails having their combination as well. According to the Generality
Constraint, if one has the ability to ascribe a predicate such as ‘is feeling pain’ to oneself and
think “I’m feeling pain,” one must also have the ability to ascribe such a predicate to another
subject S and think “S is feeling pain.” It then follows that one must actually have the thoughtelement of other subjects of experience. Thus, Strawson cannot argue that self-ascription has
priority over other-ascription by claiming that a self-conscious being lacks an actual possession
of the thought-element of other subjects of experience.
I thus hold that self-ascription does not have priority over other-ascription and that there
is a constitutive link between self-ascription and other-ascription. Because of such a constitutive
link, self-consciousness must involve a conception of other subjects of experience. Thus, MSC,
consciousness of oneself solely in one’s mental aspects, must involve a conception of other
subjects, and therefore COT’ is true. If COT’ is true and MSC involves other-ascription, then,
according to P. F. Strawson’s theory of persons, MSC must involve a conception of oneself not
just in one’s mental aspects but also in one’s bodily aspects, since one must have a sense of
relevant bodily features in order to ascribe the mental features to others.
3.3

Self-Ascription, Thought-Elements, and Full-Fledged Concepts

I’ve argued that if one has the thought-elements that allow one to self-ascribe mental features,
one must have the thought-elements that allow one to ascribe such mental features to others. If
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Strawson wants to defend his position that having the thought-element of subject of experience
and the thought-element of not-oneself does not entail having a thought-element of other subjects
of experience, Strawson needs to provide more arguments. I think there is still one possible way
for Strawson to defend his position. I will consider this possibility in what follows.
Strawson can argue that for one to have the thought-element of other subjects, there is a
condition that one needs to satisfy. However, it is possible for one to have the thought-element of
subject of experience and the thought-element of not-oneself but fail to satisfy such a condition.
Going back to Evans’ Generality Constraint, we can see that the constitutive link between the
ability to self-ascribe mental features and the ability to ascribe such mental features to others is
grounded in the ability to know what it is for someone to have certain mental features. Strawson
can then argue that for one to be able to have the thought-element of other subjects and ascribe
mental features to others, one needs to satisfy the condition of knowing what it is for someone to
have certain mental features, which is quite conceptually demanding. Strawson can argue that to
know what it is for someone to have certain mental features, one must have some full-fledged
concepts of those mental features. However, it is possible that a self-ascriber does not have fullfledged concepts of mental features. Thus, a self-ascriber, who has the thought-element of
oneself and the thought-element of subject of experience, may still be unable to ascribe mental
features to others, and therefore does not have the thought-element of other subjects.
Is it really possible for a self-ascriber to have no full-fledged concepts of the mental
features which one ascribes to oneself? Is it possible for one who is able to think “I’m feeling
depressed,” for example, to not have a full-fledged concept of feeling depressed? For Strawson,
in order for one to think that “I’m feeling depressed,” one only needs to have “some conception”
of feeling depressed. So the question here is what Strawson’s “having some conception” means.
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Strawson is in fact quite ambivalent about his notion of having some conception of experience
here. He is not clear about whether having some conception of experience amounts to having the
thought-element of experience. He claims that he uses 'some conception of experience' since
'some conception of experience' is looser than 'the thought-element of experience’ in the sense
that “the latter seems more likely to invite the objection that self-consciousness does not
obviously require possession of any general concept of experience...that goes beyond (a) having
visual and auditory experience, say, and (b) being fully self-conscious with all that entails. But
this, perhaps, is not very satisfactory” (121, n. 30).
But even if having some conception of experience amounts to having some thoughtelement of experience, and thus to think “I’m feeling depressed,” one needs to have the thoughtelement of feeling depressed, there is still room for Strawson to argue that one nevertheless does
not need to have some full-fledged concept of feeling depressed. On Strawson’s view, thoughtelements include a wide range of things, and full-fledged concepts are just a part of them. As I
mentioned in section 3.2, Strawson defines thought-elements as “experience-structuring mental
elements” (44). In the introduction of his book, he mentions that he understands “structuring” in
“a wide sense according to which any contribution to the character of experience is a
contribution to its structure” (2). His thought-elements thus include not only concepts, but also
moods and emotional dispositions, and even some “determinants of the experiential character of
experience that are neither moods nor cognitive formations” that creatures such as newborn
babies can be said to have an experience of pain without plausibly being taken to have some fullfledged concept of pain (2). Strawson’s notion of thought-element thus allows one to have
thought-element of certain experience without having the full-fledged concept of such
experience. Thus, since one can have the thought-element of certain experience without having
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the full-fledged concept of such experience, one is then unable to know what it is for someone to
have such experience. And since one does not know what it is for someone to have such
experience, the condition of Evans’ Generality Constraint is not met. Strawson can thus defend
his position such that having the thought-element of subject of experience and the thoughtelement of not oneself does not imply having the thought-element of other subjects and that there
is not a constitutive link between self-ascription and other-ascription.
However, if Strawson defends his position by arguing that one can have the thoughtelement of certain experience without having the full-fledged concept of such experience, I think
he will run into a problem with his mental self view. If such kind of thought-elements, the kind
that one can have without having some full-fledged concepts, is what Strawson has in mind when
he argues that self-consciousness involves a conception of the mental self, then it seems that his
overall mental self view will be undermined. The reason his mental self view will be undermined
is that it is unclear what this sense of having a conception of the mental would mean. It seems
that, on this understanding, having a conception of the mental amounts to just having some
experiences, which are essential mental. But such notion of having a conception of the mental
seems to be dissatisfying.
When Strawson explains what it means to have a thought-element or a conception of the
mental, he says, “for something to be figured as mental is for it to feature in experience in a way
that simply does not require possession of anything like the fully-fledged concept” (68). He
suggests that to experience something as mental in this way is just like experiencing something
as colored that a neonate does without having a concept of color (68). However, it is hard to see
how the mental can “feature in experience” in the same way that colors do.
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It seems that Strawson, here, is appealing to an intuition that there are some phenomena
that are directly presented to us as featuring in mental states, such as thoughts, feelings, etc.,
whereas some other phenomena are presented to us as featuring in bodily states, such as
proprioception. Strawson thus may argue that to have a conception of the mental in the way that
neonates have a conception of the color is just to have a grasp of a difference between mental
phenomena and bodily awareness, just like neonates may have a grasp of different colors in their
perceptual experiences. However, this claim relies solely on an intuition that there is something
that is mental which is distinctive from the body. But without a theoretical account of how the
conception of the mental is different from the conception of the body, Strawson’s view then does
not provide a satisfactory account of the mental self that can counter the embodied self view.
3.4

Conclusion

I’ve explained Strawson’s view of our ordinary conception of the self, which is a subject of
experience-as-single-mental-thing. I then turned to Strawson’s notion of a minimal form of selfconsciousness, or MSC. Strawson argues that MSC is consciousness of oneself solely in one’s
mental aspects, and that MSC involves a conception of the self since it involves a conception of
oneself as a subject of experience-as-single-mental-thing. Thus, MSC involves a conception of
oneself as a mental self. I then objected to Strawson’s mental self view by drawing on P. F.
Strawson’s theory of persons. I argued that MSC, which necessarily involves self-ascription,
must involve a conception of oneself as having a body. Moreover, and more importantly, it is
because there is a constitutive link between self-ascription and other-ascription that MSC
involves a conception of oneself as having a body. I then turned to COT’, the thesis that MSC
must involve a conception of other subjects of experience, to discuss Strawson’s response to P.
F. Strawson’s challenge. I pointed out that Strawson’s objection to COT’ does not really address
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the issue about the constitutive link between self-ascription and other-ascription. I then drew on
Evans’ Generality Constraint to further illustrate on such constitutive link and argue for COT’. I
then held that MSC must involve a conception of other subjects and thereby maintained that
MSC involves a conception of oneself not just in one’s mental aspects but also in one’s bodily
aspects. Thus, Strawson fails to establish his mental self view.
I then considered and replied to several possible objections. I argued that if Strawson
defends his position against COT’ by claiming that self-conscious thoughts do not necessarily
obey the Generality Constraint, and does so by arguing that a self-ascriber may ascribe mental
features to distinct subjects at different points in time who are all oneself, then he will end up
begging the question. Furthermore, if Strawson opts to argue that self-ascription has priority over
other ascription, and does so by arguing that MSC does not involve full-fledged concepts of the
experiences one ascribe to oneself, then he will end up weakening his mental self view. I thus
conclude that Strawson fails to provide a satisfactory account of the mental self that can counter
the embodied self view.
I think examining Strawson’s mental self view and how his view is opposed to the
embodied self view reveals that our notion of the self is complex and involves quite a few
conceptual preconditions, such as conceiving of oneself as a single thing and conceiving of
others as subjects of experience. Knowing about those conceptual preconditions and how they
are satisfied may help us understand how we develop the ability to think of ourselves as selves
and how our conception of the body and the conception of others contribute to this ability.
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